Battlefield Resolve and the Seeds of Defeat

The Army has announced a new rifle. It's spectacular and guaranteed to give American soldiers a giant leap forward in personal armament. But this begs a question: Who cares what armament we have? We can have the best guns, best trained troops, best support systems and best planners and officers. We can have a mighty force that, on paper, cannot be defeated by any present foe. But without the will to use that power, it's no better than masturbating to sire children. Oh, a stray sperm might somehow find it's way to an ovum, but the chances are slim indeed. There's a book written by General Rupert Smith called "The Utility of Force." In reality, it should be called "The Futility of Force" because there is nothing quite as futile as having the ability but not the desire. That's the position we find ourselves as a nation. Our military force is without peer but we dare not use it because someone may die because of the use of that very force. In other words, we're too good for our own good.

One wonders if the Roman army stationed at Hadrian's wall felt the same. They too had overwhelming force, a solid command structure, an incredible supply and resupply line and the ability to move fast, bring to bear superior arms and superior tactics yet they were defeated by marginally trained smaller forces who were not unwilling to use and apply the force they had at their command. I guarantee you that the Taliban do not file AA Reports, account for casualties they inflict or property they destroy. If a commander fails, he is replaced. They do not have to worry about gay rights, women's issues, promotion schedules or rotating troops out. Most of them are armed at 1/10th of the typical American soldier. They have no body armor and no personal communication capability. They do not need to get permission to engage the enemy. They do not have to be fired on first and to get wounded is a badge of honor. Yet these people take on forces that overwhelm them in every capability and they are winning in some areas. They can't take us on in a head-to-head fight because regardless of how good they are as a light infantry, they have no air support and none carry enough ammunition to engage in a sustained fight.

There is a distinct possibility that without air support, we would be hard pressed to achieve the accomplishments we have done to date on the battlefield and there is only one reason: We absolutely will not use the resources at our command to guarantee an outcome in our favor.

In many ways, our current state of operations in the Mideast, make Vietnam look like a colossal success. Force is useless if one doesn't use it and we don't have the strength of resolve or belief in the righteousness of our cause to be effective in the field. Individual soldiers, are, of course, gallant and serve with distinction. But the overall lack of a plan and the variance of ROEs which change on a daily basis in some cases, sap the development of any cohesive core of actionable plans and/or paradigms that have, as their outcome, the total victory by the American Military Forces and the total subjugation of any and all enemy forces.

The famous treatise ascribed to Lao Tsu called "The Art of War" goes completely unheeded by our administration. One of the main points brought out in the book is that an Army cannot fight both an enemy and it's leaders. To do so is to curry defeat. We are currying like crazy and now positing the establishment of another AO that will be populated by American troops with no plan for victory. Doesn't this administration have any regard for the military men and the zeitgeist of both the military and the command structure tasked with operating in these areas? It appears not.

FB