There aren't a lot of real Al Qa'ida operatives. It's actually a hard organization to get into. They have certain requirements. However, they do have lots of soldiers or supporters who are more like wanna-bes: They don't have the qualifications to get into the core group so they volunteer to do all kinds of things to prove their worth. The core of Al Qa'ida are smart, ruthless and completely driven by ideology. It's easy to think of them like one would think of U.S. Army Special Forces. They go into areas and develop assets to carry out Al Qa'ida missions. Often, these missions are not centrally driven but are locally driven and the mission depends on area.
Under the Bush administration, the ability of these people to operate was greatly diminished. How did he do it? He went after the money. Whole teams of agents worked in dimly lit rooms on computers and their tasks were to disrupt the Al Qa'ida money supply. In the process, names of intermediaries surfaced. These amounted to contacts, subagents and people like the coordinators who we saw operate during the massacre in Mumbai. (This is the new name for the city most knew as Bombay. I wonder if the gin maker will change the name from Bombay Gin to Mumbai Gin to be politically correct.) But while we had names and approximate whereabouts, getting to them was something else entirely. We can't just send agents into foreign countries to "take out" belligerents. We might be powerful but we have limitations. It's funny because of the way we have been educated, we tend to think along certain lines that limit our ability to deal with systems that don't match our own. Korzybski was clear about this. Thought processes can free thinking but also restrict it. The restrictions are indicated by the structure of our speech. Another problem was that we had so much data on foreign operatives, that it was sometimes hard to filter out who the important players were and who were simply mouthpieces. We didn't have the manpower to investigate every name that we gathered.
Now we have a different program in place. Many of the programs initiated by Bush were axed by Obama. Some of these were the most effective intelligence gathering operation we had in place since WWII. We have decided, as policy, to change the playground so fewer people stray into armed alternatives. What do I mean by this? It's simple, we are trying to develop or assist governments to develop opportunities in the hope that these will lure potential combatants into peaceful endeavors. What a great idea! How could something like this go wrong. Well, I'm going to point out one potential snag.
Canadians, with the possible exception of French-Canadians (That pesky and ridiculous hyphen again.) Americans, Mexicans, Japanese and citizens of many other countries have a clear concept of America, Mexico, Japan, etc. In other words, people have a national identity even though they may represent a minority in that country. This is not the case in many countries in the mideast and is especially true in Afghan and Pak. Iraq was different because, for a time, they really had a government and a national army. There was an identity. In Pak, it's different. I have correspondence with a Pak who is in the government. He's pretty high up in the hierarchy. We were casually talking and I was stunned to realize that this sophisticated, urbane, very well educated man really didn't have a strong concept of Pakistan as a sovereign state. Wow! I had a conversation with some Afghans and came away with the same feeling. It wasn't that anyone said directly that they weren't Afghan but how they talked about their country.
We are dealing with governments who have members of those government operating without a clear perspective of their own country. They do have tribal allegiances though and often departments reflect this. So, questions arise:
1. What do we think we are going to create in these areas?
2. Do our plans take the lack of a "national" concept into the equations we are using in dealing with these governments?
2a. If we are factoring this into our plans, how long do we think it will take before the typical Afghan or Pak views his country the same as a typical American views America?
2b. If we aren't taking the lack of a concept into consideration, how can we possibly determine whether anything we do is successful?
3. How much is religion connected with country concept and are Afghans or Paks willing to divide the two as we have done?
Predator strikes are not policy. They may give emotional gratification but I want to posit something many might not be considering. Families are extensive in both Afghan and Pak. People have local families but also family members in a lot of places. Many young men went to Madrasahas to study Islam and these schools were the root of the Taliban (Students) in the uncontrolled border areas. In fact, there are similar schools that are local. The predator strikes do get us some kills but the collateral damage is huge. People who have lost family due to collateral damage are unforgiving in their condemnation of the policy that so freely takes, what they consider to be, innocent lives.
The average Afghan and Pak do not like the Taliban. They want music and poetry and Islamic festivals that go on for days. Much of the Islam practiced in these areas is of the Sufi variety where religious experience is a big part of life and music, art and poetry add to the quality of life, not the quantity of life. Many people do not want these festivals and celebrations to stop.
The Taliban comes in and tells them that dancing, singing, making music and poetry are against Allah and the Koran. (I haven't even written about the cookies and cakes but that's for another post.) But while the average person wants festivals, it's not so clear that the average person has a clear concept or wants a "Western" type country. Until we start factoring this into our plans, we are woefully unprepared for any success we have that doesn't match what we consider success. This is sad and shows the myopia of American foreign policy.
FB
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